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Southern Superiority
During the past several decades, numerous studies have attempted to trace
the failure of Confederate nationalism, document a supposed lack of will in the
Confederacy, and study desertion and dissent in southern armies and on the
home front. Jason Phillips's Diehard Rebels looks at the other side of the
question û why did so many Confederate soldiers continue to fight literally until
the very end, long after the point that some contemporaries judged, and virtually
all historians conclude, that their cause was hopeless?
On the surface, Phillips's answer is simple. In providing it, however, he has
much to say about southern culture and religion, Confederate nationalism, the
roots and nature of the Lost Cause, and the psychology of veteran soldiers caught
up in a vast, brutal, and bloody war. Phillips argues that diehard Rebels, of which
there were certainly tens of thousands, truly believed they were unconquerable . .
. . They submitted to unending carnage and squalor because they expected to win
(2). In short, they shared an ethos or culture of invincibility (2).
In the first two chapters, Phillips explains that antebellum southern culture
had much to do with forming this ethos of southern superiority long before the
war began. The South's evangelical religious heritage tended to regard white
southerners as a chosen people and to trust that an omniscient God directed or
permitted all human events. Confederate victories thus reinforced assumptions
that God favored the cause of the South; defeats, meanwhile, were only God's
ways of chastising his beloved and teaching them to rely primarily on His
goodness rather than their own strength. Antebellum mythology and stereotypes
played a role as well. Southern men went off to war believing the Cavalier myth
of southern superiority over boorish Yankee Roundheads. Moreover, the
roughness of southern life bred a militant defense of honor and the Rebel
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soldier's sense that, in the words of W. J. Cash, nothing living could cross him
and get away with it (45). As the war progressed, southern preconceptions of
northerners hastened the depersonalization of the enemy that inevitably occurs
during wartime. Soldiers, especially, easily convinced themselves that their
opponents were incompetent; or, if not inferior fighters, they were evil and
barbaric. Reunion with, or surrender to such fiends was not an option. Soldiers
convinced themselves and clergymen preached that surely God would not deliver
his people into the hands of such a thieving, rapacious, unscrupulous foe.
In the next two chapters, Phillips imaginatively reconstructs how
Confederate soldiers perceived the war from their worm's eye view. He argues
that diehards were not delusional or bombastic when they continued to predict
ultimate triumph; they were rational people who saw and fought a war radically
different from the one we imagine in retrospect (4). They interpreted disasters
such as the fall of Vicksburg, the destruction of Atlanta, or even the loss of
Richmond not in the light of what we know now, but in light of their own world
view and severely limited knowledge of the larger situation. Even with the
telegraph, reliable information traveled slowly if at all to the men in the ranks
and even to officers. Most knew little of what transpired beyond the world of
their own company, and they constantly spread and attempted to evaluate rumors
of fantastic southern victories, major Union disasters, and foreign intervention
for the Confederate nation. Moreover, some battles that historians have judged to
be Confederate defeats scarcely appeared so to men in the ranks who knew only
that their unit had held its sector of the field. Additionally, large military reviews
and the bonds of camaraderie gave Confederates an exaggerated impression of
their own army's strength; meanwhile, most of the Union soldiers they
encountered up close were dispirited prisoners.
The final chapter argues that the Confederate culture of invincibility evolved
into the legend of the Lost Cause, as it emphasized southern valor and
righteousness and Yankee barbarity. Even after defeat, southern diehards
remained defiant. Thus, unlike other scholars, Phillips emphasizes the extent to
which the Lost Cause inhibited rather than fostered sectional reconciliation.
This book is grounded in impressive research, though Phillips openly admits
its limits. He relies on hundreds of letters of Confederate soldiers of all ranks
from the three main Confederate armies û the Army of Northern Virginia, the
Army of Tennessee, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi. However, he
excludes partisan forces and Confederate sailors and prisoners. He also draws
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insights from secondary works in psychology, anthropology, and the sociology
of religion. Yet he does so judiciously and cautiously, and never enough to
damage the book's readability or narrative flow.
I do have some minor quibbles. Phillips casually asserts that while southern
or Confederate nationalism failed, the culture of invincibility lived on. (3)
Perhaps, but scholars have recently questioned whether Confederate nationalism
actually failed after Appomattox, or whether instead it continued to evolve into
new forms, just as it had since secession. Phillips does not tackle this thorny
question directly. Moreover, I wonder, could not the culture of invincibility itself
have been a key component of southern nationalism? In another place, the
sophistication of Phillips's discussion on the role of religion in soldiers'
perceptions perhaps leads him to ignore a central primary source. He seems
struck by how often soldiers wrote home or to their diaries, If God is for us, who
can be against us? (25) and then ponders for several paragraphs what those men
must have meant. He seems unaware that the sentence comes directly from
Romans 8:31, the context of which probably makes the soldiers' meaning clear.
Despite these very minor complaints, this is an extremely well-researched
and readable book. It should find a place on the syllabi of many graduate
seminars as well as laymen's bookshelves. It is important for several reasons. It
will become required reading for anyone interested in the psychology and
motivations of Civil War soldiers, Confederate nationalism and will, the Lost
Cause, and postwar reconciliation. Rather than ask why soldiers fought (i.e.,
nationalism, ideology, camaraderie, trust in their leaders) it is more concerned
with why they continued to fight into late 1864 and 1865, as the Confederacy
itself was crumbling. It is also a powerful, if indirect, critique of the lack of will
thesis û the old argument that the Confederacy collapsed from within due to lack
of national unity and determination. Additionally, it breaks down artificial
chronological boundaries that historians have created so that important links
between the antebellum, wartime, and postwar southern culture are not obscured.
Finally, it is the latest work to support the growing sense among many historians
that the roots of the Lost Cause can be found in the war itself or even earlier; the
Lost Cause was not simply a cynical, deliberately fabricated reaction against
postwar social change. The book's purpose is not to revive Lost Cause
mythology; indeed, Phillips sees the growth of the culture of invincibility as
tragic, not romantic, for the South and for the nation. However, Phillips makes it
easier for usùwithout the condescension or moral smugness of modern
Americans who enjoy the benefit of hindsightùto understand how determined,
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defiant, white southerners perceived themselves and why they continued to fight.
Rod Andrew, Jr. is associate professor of history at Clemson University. His
latest book is Wade Hampton: Confederate Warrior to Southern Redeemer
(University of North Carolina Press, May 2008).
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